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Abstract-  Large centralized biometric databases, accessible 
over networks in real time are especially used for identification 
purposes. Multimodal biometric systems which are more 
robust and accurate in human identification require multiple 
templates storage of the same user analogous to individual 
biometric sources.  This may raises concern about their usage 
and security when these stored templates are compromised 
since each person is believed to have a unique biometric trait. 
Unlike passwords, the biometric templates cannot be revoked 
and switch to another set of uncompromised identifiers when 
compromised. Therefore, fool-proof techniques satisfying the 
requirements of diversity, revocability, security and 
performance are required to protect stored templates such 
that both the security of the application and the users’ privacy 
are not compromised by the impostor attacks. Thus, this 
paper proposes a template protection scheme coined as 
random rectangular hashing to strengthen the multimodal 
biometric system. The performance of the proposed template 
protection scheme is measured using the fingerprint FVC2004 
and PolyU palmprint databases.  
Keywords: biometric cryptosystems, cancellable 
biometrics, feature level fusion, multimodal biometric 
systems, random rectangular hashing, template 
protection. 
I. Introduction 
 biometric system automatically recognizes the 
person based on his/her physiological or 
behaviour characteristics [1]. As the biometric 
features are distinct to each person, it establishes direct 
connection between users and their identity. These 
systems are more ease and secure as they are not 
needed to remember any password or carry any token 
to gain access to the applications. The biometric 
systems which rely on the evidence of a single source of 
information for authentication (e.g., single fingerprint, 
iris, palm-print, retina, voice, ear or face) are known as 
Unimodal biometric systems. They often suffer from 
enrolment problems due to non-universal biometric 
traits, susceptibility to biometric spoofing or insufficient 
accuracy caused by noisy data. One of the  methods  to 
overcome these problems is to make use  of multimodal  
 
 
 
 
  
  
biometric systems, which combines information from 
multiple inputs of one or more modalities to arrive at a 
decision [2]. Depending on the level of information that 
is fused, the fusion scheme can be classified as sensor 
level, feature level, match score level and decision level 
fusion. The sensor level and the feature level are referred 
to as pre-mapping fusion while the matching score level 
and the decision level are referred to as post-mapping 
fusion [3]. The acquisition and processing sequence of 
these systems can be either serial or parallel. In the 
serial or cascade or sequential architecture, the 
acquisition and processing of the different sources take 
place sequentially and the outcome of one matcher may 
affect the processing of the subsequent sources. In the 
parallel design, different sources are processed 
independently and their results are combined using an 
appropriate fusion scheme [4]. 
The security of the system will be determined by 
the integrity of the biometric database. The conventional 
biometric systems elevate privacy and protective 
problems to the users [6]. A stolen template yields 
ruinous issues to the biometric system i.e an attacker 
recapitulates the seized template to the matching 
module to get admitted or the snatched template can be 
misused across other biometric systems for cross-
matching that uses the same biometric modality[5]. 
Therefore, if the stored template is compromised, it 
becomes useless forever. A compromised template 
cannot be revoked because of the significant link 
between a biometric trait and its template. Thus, 
template protection has come into existence due to the 
intrinsic weaknesses of traditional biometric systems. 
In general, a template protection scheme must 
fulfil the following requirements [5]: 
• Diversity: The user’s templates should differ from 
each other. The same biometric data should not be 
used in more than one application. 
• Revocability: A compromised template should be 
easily cancelled and the new template has to be 
reconstituted such that it does not alter the existing 
system performance. 
• Security: It should be computationally tough for the 
template to remake its original biometric data. 
Thereby, confirming the source data security. 
• Performance: The implementation of template 
protection method should not lower the biometric 
system performance which is computed in terms of 
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False Rejection Rate (FRR) or False Acceptance 
Rate (FAR) or Equal Error Rate (EER). 
In literature, Cancellable Biometrics [17] known 
as Transformation-based Approach and Biometric 
Cryptosystems [7] known as Helper Data Methods are 
the two approaches to secure stored single biometric 
template. Cancellable Biometrics facilitates the template 
to operate like a password which can be cancelled and 
reinstated if required. This approach assures the privacy 
and security of the actual biometric template by 
employing an irreversible transformation. Thus, the 
transformed biometric data is stored in the database 
instead of original template. This approach is 
furthermore organized as biometric salting and non-
invertible transform. In [8] Soutar et al. suggested 
biometric encryption method. Three non-invertible 
transformation functions were proposed for cancellable 
fingerprint template generation by Ratha et. al. in [9] 
namely Cartesian transformation, surface folding 
transformation and polar transformation. In [10], Teoh 
et. al. proposed Bio-Hashing technique to produce 
cancellable fingerprint templates. A new token will be 
reissued in the case of compromised template. 
Biometric Cryptosystems circumscribe the template 
protection design by including biometric data into 
cryptographic bounds. This method stringent the 
template security by employing the biometrics data to 
determine an encrypted template. In [13] Dodis et al. 
introduced secure sketch and fuzzy extractor concepts 
in key generation from biometrics. A two-level 
quantization method was introduced by Li and Chang in 
[14]  to obtain secure sketches. The practical issues in 
secure sketch construction and secure sketch 
quantization for face biometric were discussed by Sutcu 
et al. [15]. Buhan et al. in [11] addressed the problem of 
generating fuzzy extractors from continuous 
distributions.  The secure sketch construction is 
proposed for fingerprints in [12] and for multimodal 
systems (face and fingerprint) in [16]. 
This paper proposes a well-defined key-based 
transformation technique for integrated template of 
fingerprint and palmprint obtained by combining their 
respective feature vectors at feature level. In the 
proposed scheme, it is difficult to reconstruct the 
original template form the transformed template without 
submitting the distinctive secret key. A different key can 
be assigned to the biometric template for the generation 
of new one if the  transformed template is compromised.  
II. Proposed System 
The proposed scheme analyses the 
performance of multimodal biometric system that 
integrates extracted feature vectors of fingerprint and 
palmprint at feature level. This fusion level is preferred 
as it contains much richer information on the source 
data. The acquisition and processing sequence 
employed for this system is serial i.e each biometric 
source is obtained and processed independently with a 
short time interval between their successive acquisitions 
and processing. 
a) Methodology 
The following steps show the process of 
proposed template protection scheme. 
Step 1: The user Ui with identity IDi inputs fingerprint and 
palmprint data to get registered in the system.  
Step 2: Feature Extraction- The acquired fingerprint and 
palmprint data are pre-processed and enhanced by 
adopting a two dimensional discrete wavelet transform 
(2D-DWT). The mutual attributes such as ridges of 
fingerprint and palmprint images are preserved using 2D 
Gabor filter.  
G(x, y, f, θ) = exp�− x′2+y ′22σ2 �cos(2Πfx′) 
 Where x′=xcosθ+ysinθ and y′=-xcosθ+ysinθ, 
f is the frequency of the sinusoidal plane wave along the 
direction θ from the x-axis, σ2is the standard deviation of 
the Gaussian envelope. The values considered for 
experiment are f= 10, σ2=16, and θ=Π/8. 
Step 3: Normalization- As the intensity domains of 
filtered palmprint and fingerprint are different, they are 
normalized to the same domain by employing Gaussian 
normalization. G(x, y) = 𝐼𝐼(𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦)− µI
σI  
Where I(x, y) denotes the pixel intensity at 
coordinate (x, y), µI denotes the intensity mean, and σI  
denotes the intensity standard deviation. 
Step 4: Feature Level Fusion- The normalized LL sub-
band images are combined at feature level using 
Daubechies Wavelet. 
Step 5: Random Tiling- A set of rectangles with random 
characteristics of the user Ui are generated from the 
fused feature using random tiling. The magnitude of 
each rectangle is obtained by computing the standard 
deviation. These magnitudes are concatenated to 
generate a feature vector. The random tiling is a function 
‘f’ which accepts two parameters and returns a feature 
vector ‘V’. V = f (Ifused, K ), Where Ifused represents the 
fused feature, and ‘K’ is the user specific key to obtain 
the rectangles’ characteristics. A set of random numbers 
rw, rh ϵ [-1,1] are generated using ‘K’ as the seed. A new 
set of features can be extracted from the fused feature 
in the case of a compromise using newly generated key 
‘K’.  
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Figure 1 : Random rectangular blocks of fused feature 
Step 6: Cryptographic Key Generation- The biometric 
secret key ‘k’ is generated using AES algorithm which is 
the variableness origin to select the random rectangular 
regions. Thus, every user has a distinct fused template 
depending on the different unique keys generated. 
Step 7: Helper Data Generation- Cancellable biometric 
features are generated through Bio-hashing using MD5 
(Message Digest) from the random rectangle region. 
This hashing is a transformation function which 
represents the ridges in the form of a decimal vector. 
The number of ridges falling within the rectangle region 
is counted. The numbers in the decimal vector form the 
basis for generating template bit-string. The same 
process is repeated for remaining rectangular regions. 
The hash vector is obtained by combining all the 8-digit 
fixed-length vectors produced from each rectangular 
region. This hash vector acts as the helper data and is 
stored in the database. The bit-string representing the 
biometric features is generated by utilising the hash 
vector. The process of cryptographic key, ‘k’ is 
formulated from the encoded Bio-hash is as follows.  
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 ∶  𝑏𝑏𝑐𝑐  ⊕ 
𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾𝑦𝑦 𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝐵𝐵𝐾𝐾𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ∶  𝛾𝛾 ⊕  𝑏𝑏′𝑐𝑐 = k ′ 
where γ is called Biokey, bc and b'c refer to the 
encoded Bio-hash and decoded Bio-hash respectively, 
while ⊕ denotes bitwise XOR operation.  
Step 8: Bit-String Generation-The integer hash vector 
produced is insecure and occupies much of the 
database. The integer values are transformed to binary 
bit-string using the bit-block coding technique. This 
technique first initializes a fixed binary block with zeros. 
This block values will be reset to ones corresponding to 
the integer in the hash vector. This process is iterated 
for the remaining blocks of the hash vector to generate 
the binary bit-string. 
III. Experimental Results  
The databases fingerprint FVC2004 [18] and 
PolyU palmprint [19] are used for performance analysis 
of the proposed integrated template security approach. 
The experiments were conducted on the randomly 
selected 10 samples of fingerprint and palmprint images 
of respective databases. The present work assumes that 
each user is allotted with a secret key which is stored in 
the database and these keys are lost by no means. The 
enrolled and query binary vectors are produced based 
on the secret keys and the scores for identification 
between the enrolled bit-strings (e) and query bit-strings 
(q') were computed using the formula: 
𝑆𝑆𝑐𝑐𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝐾𝐾(𝐵𝐵, 𝑗𝑗) = � (𝐵𝐵𝑅𝑅=1  𝐾𝐾𝑗𝑗 ,𝑅𝑅  ⊕  𝑞𝑞𝐵𝐵 ,𝑅𝑅)
𝐿𝐿
 
where ⊕ represents the XOR operation, while 
ej,r , and qi,r  corresponds to the r-th bit in ej and qi,. L 
denotes the length of ej and qi. 
 
 
Figure 2 : Collation between the query and the enrolled template 
The collation between the enrolled and query 
binary templates is shown in Figure 2. The performance 
in terms of equal error rate (EER) with various random 
rectangles is listed in Table 1. It is observed that the rise 
in random rectangles lowers the EER. The root cause is 
that more features can be extracted with more number 
of random rectangles there by features more distinct. 
The recognition rate obtained is lower than 1% when 
tested on public databases of FVC2004 [18] and PolyU 
palmprint [19]. 
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 Table 1: Equal Error Rate (EER) of varied random rectangles 
Number of Random 
Rectangles 
EER 
10 Random Rectangles  2.81% 
15 Random Rectangles 0.32% 
20 Random Rectangles 0.20% 
IV. Conclusions 
A novel scheme based on key based hashing 
with randomized rectangle is presented in this paper 
that produces short hash strings for integrated 
templates. These hashes cannot reproduce the original 
template without knowledge of the unique key. Further, 
the use of Bio-hash as the mixing process provides the 
one-way transformation and deters exact recovery of the 
biometric features when compromised. When the 
template is compromised, it is difficult to construct the 
original hash vector because the impostors cannot 
figure out the exact location of each ridge as the count 
of number of ridges is only contained in the random 
rectangle. In the current work, the performance attained 
is lower than 1%. The diversity property of proposed 
scheme is examined by evaluating the correlation of the 
bit-strings obtained by using different user specific keys 
as seed in random tiling process. In this case, a high 
positive correlation indicates that the old bit-string falls 
into the region of acceptance of the refreshed bit-string. 
Thus, the proposed scheme satisfies all the four 
requirements of template protection scheme namely, 
revocability, security, performance and diversity. The 
future work signifies the stolen-token scheme, where the 
attacker grabs the secret key to get access to the 
system.  
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